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The Rights of Children
By ROBERT L. GEISER*
Introduction
Children's rights are a topic of considerable current interest. They
have been the subject of symposia in legal' and educational journals,2
articles in professional and popular magazines, 3 workshops and panel
discussions at professional conferences,4 manifestos by health and wel-
* B.A., 1953, Colgate University; M.S., 1955, Tufts University; Ph. D., 1961,
Boston University Chief Psychologist at the Nazareth Child Care Center in Jamaica
Plain, Mass.
The author would like to express his appreciation to Jean Fuller Farrington,
member of the third year class at Northeastern University School of Law, for her legal
research assistance and for her helpful comments on the text.
1. See, e.g., Foster & Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAMILY L.Q. 343
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Foster & Freed]; Children and the Law-A Symposium,
20 CATH. LAW. 85 (1974); Symposium-Children and the Law, 39 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 1 (1975); Symposium on Children and the Law, 18 CATH. LAW. 90 (1972).
2. See, e.g., The Rights of Children, Special Issue (pts. 1-2), 43 HARV. Enuc.
REv. 481, 44 HARV. EDUC. REV. 1 (1973-74); Symposium-Rights of Children: Human
and Legal, PEABODY J. OF EDUC. 87 (1973).
3. See, e.g., Cass, What Rights for Children?, SAT. REV./WORLD, May 4, 1974,
at 67; Farson, Next-Children's Lib?, FORBES, Jan. 15, 1974, at 34; Forer, The Rights
of Children, 27 YOUNG CHILDREN 332 (1972); Glasser, Do Children Have Rights?,
HARPERS, Feb. 1975, at 118; Gould, Children's Rights: More Liberal Games, SOCIAL
POLICY, July-Aug. 1971, at 50; Konopka, The Needs, Rights and Responsibilities of
Youth, 55 CHILD WELFARE 173 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Konopka]; Marker &
Friedman, Rethinking Children's Rights, CHILDREN TODAY, Nov. 1973, at 8; Paulsen, The
Legal Rights of Children, 50 CHILDHOOD EDUC. 327 (1974); Schultz, Waifs of the
Court: The Problems of Problem Children, NATION, Oct. 29, 1973, at 426; The New
Child: No Kidding, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 4, 1974, at 75; Children's Rights: The Latest
Crusade, TIME, Dec. 25, 1972, at 41; Children's Rights, TRIAL, May-June 1974, at 11-
41; Drive for Rights of Children, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Aug. 5, 1974, at 42.
4. For example, the American Orthopsychiatric Association, a group composed
of individuals from many different disciplines interested in mental health and children,
held workshops on children's rights at its last two annual conventions. Topics included
the rights to education of children out of school; due process, equal protection and sta-
tutory rights of handicapped children to education at public expense; strategies, such as
litigation, advocacy and ombudsmen, for implementing the best interests of the child;
and legal activity with respect to children's services and important recent developments
in the field of mental health law, including due process in commitment and treatment
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fare organizations, 5 and many books.' As might be expected, when a
topic is the shared concern of lawyers, judges, legislators, educators,
health professionals, and assorted others, the end result is likely to be
considerable diversity of opinion. Beliefs differ on many of the central
questions: how to define children's rights, how to decide which chil-
dren should have which rights, under what circumstances and to what
extent? Disagreements arise from basic differences in the attitudes of
adults toward children and childhood. One's opinions about children
determine one's perception of the rights children require.
This article will delineate and contrast four major viewpoints about
children found within the childen's rights movement today. Although
each set of beliefs has its present day adherents, to some extent these
attitudes represent an historical evolution in thinking about children and
their rights. While adults interested in children's rights may have differ-
ent assumptions about children, they all share a common concern for the
well-being of America's 80 million children.
Protecting Children's Welfare
In New York City in 1874, a "charitable lady" discovered that an
eight year old child, Mary Ellen, was being treated with shocking
brutality by her foster parents. The woman was frustrated in her
subsequent attempts to persuade several institutions to take the child
under their care, and was unable on her own to obtain a court order to
and legal limitations on treatment. Other organizations dealing with children's rights
are the American Psychological Association, the Child Welfare League of America and
various state social welfare groups.
5. See, e.g., JOINT COMMISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH OF CHILDREN, U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, CRISIS IN CHILD MENTAL HEALTH 3 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as CRISIS IN CHILD MENTAL HEALTH] (proposed rights for every
infant in America); Rights for Foster Children, CHILDREN TODAY, July-Aug. 1973, at
20-21; The True Spirit of Christmas, 26 NAT'L REV., Jan. 4, 1974, at 24 (reprint-
ing the U.N. Declaration of the Rights of the Child). The Declaration of Youths'
Rights and Responsibilities of the Youth of the State of Connecticut was formulated in
1974 by two hundred youth delegates meeting in Hartford, Connecticut, sponsored by
the Judiciary Committee of the state legislature, the PTA, and the Quality of Life
Conference.
6. See, e.g., P. ADAMS & L. BERG, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS-TOWARD THE LIBERATION
OF THE CHILD (1971); L. COLE, OUR CHIDRENS KEEPERS (1972); R. FARSON, BIRTH-
RIGHTS (1974); H. FOSTER, JR., A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN (1974); J. HOLT,
ESCAPE FROM CHILDHOOD (1974); A. LEVINE, THE RIGHTS OF STUDENTS: ACLU HAND-
BOOK (1973); P. MURPHY, OUR KINDLY PARENT-THE STATE (1974); CHILDREN'S LIBER-
ATION (D. Gottlieb ed. 1972); LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN: STATUS, PROGRESS, AND
PROPOSALS (COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. ed. 1973); THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN:
EMERGENT CONCEPTS IN LAW AND SOCIETY (A. Wilkerson ed. 1973).
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remove the child from the home. While there were at that time a few
laws intended to protect children from abuse, no one seemed willing to
take responsibility for enforcing those laws.
As a last resort, this samaritan turned to Henry Bergh, founder and
president of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals.
Organized some eight years earlier, the SPCA looked after the welfare
of "dumb beasts," seeing to it that horses, oxen, cattle and dogs were not
maltreated. Though Mary Ellen's case technically did not fall within
the scope of the special act prohibiting cruelty to animals, Bergh rea-
soned that since a child is a member of the animal kingdom the SPCA
could intervene on Mary Ellen's behalf.
The Society instituted a habeas corpus action and won. Mary
Ellen was removed from the custody of her abusive foster mother, who
was sentenced to one year in the penitentiary at hard labor. Nearly
twenty months after its inception, Mary Ellen's case was finally
resolved-she was sent to an institution.
7
Though Mary Ellen subsequently disappeared from the pages of
history, two memorials to her existence remained. One was the first
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children.8 The other was the
demonstration by her case that the legal system would support private,
third-party intervention on behalf of children caught in physically dam-
aging environments. Although the child still had a few legal rights as a
human being, he at least had achieved justice equal to that provided a
cur on the streets.
From this beginning there developed a large number of advocates
concerned with the welfare of children. In a sense, these allies were the
spiritual descendants of Mary Ellen's "charitable lady." In their view,
the child had a right to be protected from abuse and mistreatment by
adults. To insure this right, they sought to wrap children in a mantle of
paternalistic legislation. State Humane Societies and the Societies for
the Prevention of Cruelty to Children led the fight against child abuse
and neglect. After its establishment in 1912, the Children's Bureau
joined in the crusade against the exploitation of children in the labor
market.
In the opinion of these early adherents to the cause of children and
their present day counterparts, children by nature are helpless, innocent,
7. There is no written judicial opinion for the case of Mary Ellen Wilson, but
contemporary reports from the New York Times are collected in 2 CHILDRFN AND
YoUTH IN AMERICA 185-89 (R. Bremner ed. 1971).
8. Id. at 189-97.
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vulnerable, and in need of protection.9 Hence, children do not require
many legal rights'" of their own.'1
Child abuse legislation promoted by adherents of this view 12 serves
a dual purpose. First, it acts as a moral expression of the childrearing
standards of the community, spelling out what is not a proper physcal
and moral environment for rearing children." For example, under
statutes in various states parents are deemed neglectful if they allow a
child to beg or sing on the streets for money, to associate with immoral
people, to live in a house of ill-repute, to work in a bar, or to live an idle,
dissolute or immoral life. Parents who use profane language or perform
immoral or illegal acts in front of children are likewise at fault.'I
The second function of child abuse legislation is that of permitting
the judicial system to move against those parents who fail to live up to
the prescribed standards. Intervention of the courts was intended to
force parents to care for their children. 15 In the event that this judicial
intrusion failed to produce the desired result, offending parents could be
punished by fines, imprisonment or-the ultimate penalty-removal of
the child from the parents' care.
It was left to the courts to interpret and implement abuse-neglect
legislation. Courts had, over the years, developed their own views of
9. An article in Newsweek expresses the opinon that "Western man has never
been able to make up his mind what a child is-weak and innocent, needing protection,
or wild and primitive, needing discipline and education. And adults are still swinging
metronomically from one extreme to the other." NEWSWEEK, Mar. 4, 1974, at 75.
10. As used here, a legal right is any legally "enforceable claim to the possession
of property or authority, or to the enjoyment of privileges or immunities." Rodham,
Children Under the Law, 43 HARV. EDUC. REV. 487, 488 (1973).
11. "Child citizens, although their needs and interests may be greater than those
of adults, have far fewer legal rights (and duties). Indeed, the special needs and in-
terests which distinguish them from adults have served as the basis for not granting them
rights and duties, and for entrusting enforcement of the few rights they have to insti-
tutional decisionmakers." Id.
12. Abuse-neglect laws supported by proponents of the view that children need
more protection than rights are collected and summarized in Kate, Howe & McGrath,
Child Neglect Laws in America, 9 FAM. L.Q. 1, 75 (1975).
13. The importance of morality to the early child welfare advocates is revealed
in the following quote, concerning the necessity of removing children from their parents:
"[Tlhe home should not be broken up for reasons of poverty, but only for consider-
ations of inefficiency or immorality." CONFERENCE ON THE CARE OF DEPENDENT
CHILDREN, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 193 (1909).
14. For a collection of the relevant statutes for each state for each of these ex-
amples, see S. KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAIL 84-85 & n.17-19, 23, 25 (1971).
15. See, e.g., MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-1300 (Cum. Supp. 1975). Section
1300 sets forth the purpose of the Montana statute as, in part, compulsion of "the parent
. . . of a youth to perform the moral and legal duty owed to the youth ....
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children and families. On one hand, the Anglo-American legal system
protected children from the rigors of dealing with the outside world. On
the other hand, it followed a policy of minimal interference with the
parent-child relationship, no matter how harsh the realities of family
life. The so-called "disabilities of infancy," such as the inability of
children to enter into binding contracts, developed "not for the defeat of
[minors'] rights, but to shield and protect them from the acts of their
own improvidence, as well as from the acts of others."' 6  States, as
parens patriae, enacted special legislation for the benefit and protection
of minors, which has been consistently upheld by the courts.' 7  These
judicial pronouncements and legislative enactments primarily affect a
child's relationship with society at large rather than altering his relation-
ship with his parents.
The powerful respect for the family structure displayed by the
contemporary legal system reflects centuries of Anglo-American tradi-
tion. In thirteenth century England, a son was under the protection of
his father until the latter's death or until the child was emancipated,
either by gift of some of his inheritance or through attainment of
office."8 By 1753, when Blackstone wrote his Commentaries, a child
was emancipated at the age of 21 as a matter of law. Yet the broad
authority of the parent over the child remained "sufficient to keep the
child in order and obedience."' 9  Legal recognition of parental power
was intended partly to help parents perform their duties effectively and
partly to reward them for doing the job at all.20
The American legal system, based as it is on precedent, has found
it extraordinarily difficult to overcome hundreds of years of such judicial
support for the traditional family system. Thus, to the courts, the
important factors in protecting children are preservation of the sanctity
of the family and maintenance of strong parental rights. In most cases,
the child's best interests are presumed to be synonymous with those of
16. In re Davidson, 223 Minn. 268, 272, 26 N.W.2d 223, 225 (1947). This case
points out that at majority the child acquired some rights, among them rights to manage,
control and convey property, to retain personal earnings, and to make contracts.
17. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (state law prohibiting
sale of girlie magazines to minors upheld). In sustaining a cudrfew, the Maryland Su-
preme Court mentioned the inability of minors to vote, to purchase liquor, to drive, or
to engage in certain businesses as comparable protective measures. Thistlewood v. Trial
Magistrate for Ocean City, 236 Md. 548, 554, 204 A.2d 688, 692 (1964).
18. See 2 BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 34-35 (S. Thorne
transl. 1968).
19. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMTarAIuS *452.
20. Id. at *425-26.
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his parents. The courts reason that, by insuring the rights of parents,
the welfare of the child is guarded. It is assumed that most people do a
conscientious job of childrearing and that adults in general and parents
in particular, know best what that child needs. 2' Consequently, the
courts have been very reluctant to interfere with the child-raising func-
tion of natural parents or to intrude upon the sanctity of the family.22
It is when parents fail in their childrearing obligations that judicial
intervention becomes necessary in the difficult areas of child custody,
foster care, divorce, adoption, delinquency, and child neglect and abuse.
It is then that adults outside the family must concern themselves with the
best interests of the child.
The courts have shown great reluctance to consider the child's
welfare as other than identical with his parents'. So strong is the
presumption that the child's interests are best served by living with his
biological parents that even in flagrant cases of abuse, the courts move
conservatively and cautiously.28 When the judiciary does intervene
under the doctrine of parens patriae, scrupulous attention is paid to the
parents' legal rights. 24  It is more important to some adults that a child
be placed in a foster home of the same religious faith as that of the
21. "The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of
parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of
the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an
enduring American tradition." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972). "It is
cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents,
whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). "We
presume that in most instances parents, proceeding in utmost good faith, acting for the
child, in the child's best interests, properly guide, protect, and control their chil-
dren. . . . [The state] has an interest in preserving the family unit and maintaining
parental authority over children ...... Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1047-
48 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
22. In their hesitance to intercede on the child's behalf, the courts probably re-
flected the moral tone of the times. The zeal of some of early child welfare advocates
in defending the family is evident in the following observation: "Home life is the
highest and finest product of civilization. It is the great molding force of mind and
of character. Children should not be deprived of it except for urgent and compelling
reasons." CONFERENCE ON THE CARE OF DEPENDENT CHILDREN, 60th Cong., 2d Sess.
192 (1909).
23. See, e.g., In re S, 259 N.Y.S.2d 164 (Fam. Ct. 1965). Although the court
there found parental neglect, it refused to take the child away from his parents.
24. See, e.g., Alsager v. District Ct., 406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975). In
Alsager Iowa's parental rights termination statute was successfully challenged on grounds
of vagueness. The court said that "termination must only occur when more harm is
likely to befall the child by staying with his parents than by being permanently separated
from them." Id. at 24.
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natural mother, than in a home with loving foster parents of a different
faith.2 5
Child welfare professionals who work with children in foster care
can attest to the difficulties encountered in many jurisdictions in at-
tempting to free an abused or neglected child for adoption over the
parents' objections and without their consent, or to persuade courts to
recognize psychological neglect in the absence of physical abuse. 26 From
personal experience, many professionals can tell of the frustration of
having a court remove a child from an adoptive placement to restore
him to a natural mother who, after a year's absence, suddenly reappears
and demands the return of her child.27
As the preceding examples indicate, while the welfare of the child
is important, it is not paramount. Other values and rights are given
more weight. Early in this century, the Supreme Court of Washington
refused to hear the suit of a girl against her father who had raped her.28
Said the court, "[t]he rule of law prohibiting suits between parent and
child is based upon the interest that society has in preserving harmony in
domestic relations .... -29 That the rape might have occurred as a
result of a lack of family rapport in the first place did not seem to occur
to the court. The interests of society and families appear to come
before any right of the child not to be abused. This may be harsh
treatment of a particular child, but the legal system apparently believes
that, in the long run, favoring strong parental rights is in the best
interests of the majority of children.
The conviction that punishment, coercion and threats can prompt
people to do things they should do is a dangerous one."° Much of the
law's response to human problems originated at a time when we knew
very little about childrearing or individual psychodynamics. One does
not simply arouse the guilt of parents or otherwise stimulate their
25. See, e.g., In re Goldman, 331 Mass. 647, 121 N.E.2d 843 (1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 942 (1955). For examples of state neglect laws requiring placement in a home
which shares the natural mother's religious faith, see Katz, Howe & McGrath, Child
Neglect Laws in America, 9 FAMILY LQ. 1, 78, 93, 99, 116, 192 (1975).
26. "Unless parental cruelty is attested to by physical damage, courts hold back
from a determination of neglect." Foster & Freed, supra note 1, at 348.
27. Id. at 350.
28. Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
29. Id. at 243, 79 P. at 788. The father in Roller had been prosecuted by the
state, convicted of rape and imprisoned under the criminal code.
30. "Until quite recently, the law presumed that children in the home received
love and affection and that cases of child abuse or emotional deprivation were rare. It
is now known that the presumption is a dangerous one to make and that many parents
are brutal, indifferent, or rejecting." Foster & Freed, supra note 1, at 348.
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"parental instincts" in order to encourage them to care for a child they
have neglected. It is not possible to force inadequate people to become
adequate parents. Professor Joseph Goldstein of Yale University Law
School expressed this understanding when he said a court can "destroy
human relationships, but it cannot compel them to develop."31
There are still those interested in the welfare of children today who
believe that children need few legal rights and may best be served by
protective legislation, punitive court actions, and strong parental control
over children. As they see it, undermining parental authority or invad-
ing the privacy of the family threatens disaster to children.- When the
law does intervene, these advocates often agonize over the decisions they
must make "in the best interest of the child." While under this view-
point children must still depend upon the benevolence of adults and
the legal system, they have at least attained a greater degree of justice
than they enjoyed at common law.
Extending Legal Rights to Children
In recent years there has been a growing movement, especially in
federal courts, to extend selected legal rights to children. Courts have
begun to function as advocates for children, spelling out a set of
procedural rights for them. These rights protect children when they
come into contact with such institutions of society as juvenile courts,33
schools34 and mental hospitals. 5
This change in the thinking about children's rights was stimulated
in 1967 when the Supreme Court in In re Gault36 ruled for the first time
31. Goldstein, Finding the Least Detrimental Altenative, 27 PSYCHOANALYTIC
STUDY OF THE CHILD 626, 637 (1972). In the same vein, Patrick Murphy, reporting
on his efforts to reform the Illinois juvenile system, commented, "Trying to make a court
become a rehabilitative social instrument has been a noble experiment, but nevertheless
a failure." P. MURPHY, OUR KINDLY PARENT-THE STATE 171 (1974).
32. In an article on new rights for children, Ellen Goodman expresses this res-
ervation: "We're walking on dangerous ground .... [W]e have to acknowledge that
on the whole parents are the best protectors of their children. If we go too far and
protect kids from these protectors, interfere in family decisions, we may only relegate
them to more desperate fallout shelters." Goldman, New Rights for Children, Boston
Globe, Nov. 9, 1976, at 21, col. 1.
33. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
34. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (children's rights in school sus-
pensions).
35. See, e.g., Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968); Bartley v.
Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975), prob. juris. noted, 424 U.S. 964 (1976).
See also Ginsberg, An Examination of the Civil Rights of Mentally Ill Children, 52
CHILD WELFARE 14 (1973).
36. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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on the issue of the procedural safeguards required for children in juvenile
proceedings. Declaring that "neither the fourteenth amendment nor the
Bill of Rights is for adults alone, '37 the Court ruled that children
involved in juvenile court are entitled to most of the rights accorded
adults in criminal proceedings. These include the rights to obtain
counsel,3 8 to receive prompt notice of the charges against them, 30 to
avoid self-incrimination,40 and to confront and cross-examine wit-
nesses. 41 In effect, the Gault decision led to the recognition of children
as "persons" under the Constitution.
The attitude of the Court in Gault has been adopted by subsequent
courts to develop procedural safeguards for children in situations other
than delinquency proceedings. For example, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has applied due process
limitations to the state's power to commit children to mental institutions.
A three-judge panel ruled in Bartley v. Kremens42 that a child commit-
-ted as mentally ill must be afforded a probable cause hearing within
seventy-two hours of detention, a postcommitment hearing within two
weeks of confinement, written notice of the hearing date and of the
grounds for commitment, the right to counsel at significant stages of the
commitment proceedings, and the right to be present at hearings to
confront the witnesses against him and offer evidence.43
The state argued in Bartley that these due process rights of the
plaintiff-child could be waived by the child's parents, guardians ad
litem, or persons standing in loco parentis. The court characterized the
issue as a confrontation between children's interest in liberty and the
long recognized prerogative of parents to direct the rearing of their
children. 44 Rejecting the state's waiver contention, the court noted:
[I]f we could find that in all instances parents act in the best interest
of their children, we might also find that parents may waive con-
stitutional rights of their children. Unfortunately ... this is not
the case. 45
In some instances, then, courts may recognize that children's best inter-
ests are not synonymous with those of their parents. 46
37. Id. at 13.
38. Id. at 34-42. In the case of indigent juvenile defendants, the right to counsel
includes the right to have counsel appointed. Id.
39. Id. at 31-34.
40. Id. at 47-55.
41. Id. at 56.
42. 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975) prob. juris. noted, 424 U.S. 964 (1976).
43. Id. at 1053.
44. Id.
45. ld. at 1047.
46. The Supreme Court will review the Bartley decision shortly. The case may
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The judiciary has also moved to protect children against the arbi-
trary decisions of institutions, such as schools, which stand in loco paren-
tis. In this vein, courts have limited the authority of schools to expel
students, 47 to prescribe dress codes,48 to dictate length of hair, 49 and to
exclude unwed mothers from classes."0 For example, in Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District,1 students were ex-
pelled for wearing black arm bands in school to protest the war in
Vietnam. In its decision supporting the students' right to engage in
such actions, the Supreme Court said: "It can hardly be argued that
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. ' 52  While there is still
controversy over the extent of first amendment rights as they apply to
children, courts have held that censoring student newspapers and other
written works violates students' right to freedom of speech.13 It is likely
that the courts will be dealing with the issue of balancing students'
freedoms against the school's authority for some time to come.
More recently a sweeping decision handed down by the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama in Wyatt v.
Stickney"4 affected children committed to a state school and hospital for
the mentally retarded. The court there held that once a person has been
deprived of his civil liberties by being confined involuntarily to an
institution for treatment, he possesses an inviolable constitutional right
to habilitation. 5 This so-called "right to treatment" issue as it affects
become a milestone, both on the issue of children's rights and in mental health law.
47. See Keller v. Fochs, 385 F. Supp. 262 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (notice of charges
required in an expulsion hearing).
48. See Wallace v. Ford, 346 F. Supp. 156 (E.D. Ark. 1972); Crossen v. Fatsi,
309 F. Supp. 114 (D. Conn. 1970).
49. See Lambert v. Marushi, 322 F. Supp. 326 (S.D. W. Va. 1971); Martin
v. Davidson, 322 F. Supp. 318 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
50. See Shull v. Columbus Municipal Separate School Dist., 338 F. Supp. 1376
(N.D. Miss. 1972).
51. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
52. Id. at 506.
53. See Jacobs v. Board of School Comm'rs, 490 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1973). va-
cated as moot, 420 U.S. 128 (1975). "[I1f a [school newslpaper is published, school
administrators must not censor it arbitrarily." Paulsen, The Legal Rights of Children,
50 CHILDHOOD EDUC. 327, 328 (1974).
54. 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972). Wyatt has been reviewed in social
science periodicals and books. See, e.g., R.L. GEISER, BEHAVIOR MOD AND THE MANAGED
SOCIETY 41-47 (1976) [hereinafter cited as GEISER]; Prigmore & Davis, Wyatt v.
Stickney: Rights of the Committed, SOCIAL WORK, July 1973, at 10; Wexler, Token and
Taboo: Behavior Modification, Token Economies and the Law, 61 CAL. L. REv. 81
(1973).
55. 344 F. Supp. at 390.
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both adults and children has not been conclusively settled by the
court.O
The court in Wyatt established and ordered the implementation of
minimum constitutional standards of patient care and treatment. 57
Treating these constitutional rights as absolute, the court said that
patients cannot be deprived of the rights to have privacy,58 to receive
visits,"' to wear their own clothes,60 to have personal possessions, 61 to
engage in regular physical exercise, 62 to worship in the religion of their
choice, 63 to be outdoors daily,64 to receive nutritionally adequate
meals,65 and to be subjected to the least restrictive conditions necessary
to achieve the purposes of commitment. 6
6
In the case of children, the Wyatt court specifically added a right
not to be forced to undergo treatment procedures such as aversive
reinforcement conditioning 67 without express informed consent after
consultation with counsel and other interested parties. 68 The court held
that behavior modification programs using such aversive or noxious
stimuli had to be reviewed by the state schools' Human Rights Commit-
tee.6
9
As the foregoing cases indicate, the extension of adult rights to
children by the courts is achieved by a cautious case-by-case approach.
Following the occurrence of an abuse, a lawsuit must be initiated, and
the long, slow process of hearing, appeal and review by the courts must
be begun.
Case-by-case adjudication does recognize children as individuals to
some degree, with constitutional rights of their own and interests not
always synonymous with those of their parents. In Planned Parenthood
56. The United States Supreme Court has held that the state cannot confine a
nondangerous individual who has the ability to survive on the outside, without providing
treatment. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
57. 344 F. Supp. at 395-407.
58. .d. at 399.
59. Id.
60. id. at 403.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 402.
63. Id. at 399.
64. Id. at 402.
65. Id. at 403.
66. Id. at 401.
67. Some minor patients in institutions have been subjected to electroshock with
cattle prods as a form of aversive conditioning to discourage self-mutilation. GEISER,
supra note 54, at 74-75.
68. 344 F. Supp. at 400, 401-02.
69. Id. at 400.
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v. Danforth," for example, the Supreme Court identified a right of
pregnant teenagers to secure abortions without parental consent. The
law's concern in that instance was not with the individual child's welfare
per se but with the protection of her basic legal rights. 71 Not everyone
agrees with this approach; and the dissent in Bartley v. Kremens referred
to the majority decision as "'an overdose of due process.' ".72
Since most of the rights granted to children by these cases are
procedural, the courts have not considered other adult rights not shared
by children, such as the right to vote, to hold property, and to work.
However, certain substantive rights have been extended to children by
legislation in some states. An example of such legislation is the approv-
al of a limited right of children to obtain medical treatment without
parental consent or knowledge for specific purposes, such as treatment
of venereal disease7" or drug abuse counseling."4 Also recently enacted
is a federal statute permitting access by parents and children to informa-
tion contained in school records. 75
In the past, when society began to treat children separately from
adults, it was seen as a humane step forward. The welfare of children
70. 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976). A parental consent to a minor's abortion may not
be required, at least during the first trimester of pregnancy.
71. These cases are often class actions rather than suits by individual children.
Frederick L. v. Thomas, 408 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (education for children with
specific learning disabilities); Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975),
prob. juris. noted, 424 U.S. 964 (1976); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v.
Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (education).
72. 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1054 (E.D. Pa. 1975), prob. juris. noted, 424 U.S. 964
(1976). Further disagreement with this approach is expressed in an article by Marian
W. Edelman, director of the Children's Defense Fund. "The narrow legal approach of
merely extending adult rights to children is not the answer. Children do have, in my
view, special needs and require special protections in certain regards. Defining the
working medium between the extremes must be done carefully." U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Aug. 5, 1974, 42, at 44.
73. See Paul, Legal Rights of Minors to Sex-Related Medical Care, 6 COLUM.
HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 357, 364-65 (1975). At the time of publication of Paul's ar-
ticle, every state except Wisconsin had enacted statutes allowing minors the right to con-
sent to treatment for venereal disease.
74. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12E (Supp. 1976); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. ch. 22, § 1823 (Supp. 1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 318-B:12-a (Supp.
1975). Two lawyers, active in mental health law ha'e said: "We cannot continue to
risk the emotional, psychological and physical well-being of children and young adults
at the price of parental consent. In such sensitive areas as birth control, pregnancy,
drug abuse and emotional problems, seeking parental consent may be particularily
counter-productive." Marker & Friedman, Rethinking Children's Rights, CHILDREN
TODAY, Nov.-Dec. 1973, at 8, 11.
75. See Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g
(Supp. V, 1975).
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improved when they were removed from adult prisons, mental hospitals,
and almshouses, and from the often horrendous work conditions of
factories. The establishment of separate legal networks to deal with the
problems of children may have been more humane, but the price that
children had to pay was deprivation of many legal rights of their own.
A benevolent system that considered the best interests of children was
thought by many to obviate the need for children to have their own
rights. But even the best of systems has abuses. The reforms of the
juvenile system brought about by Gault began the movement by the
courts to set legal limits on how differently children may be treated
from adults. 76
Needs Manifestos
A third group of children's rights adherents employ the "needs
manifesto" approach. 7  This term refers to the propensity of some
advocates, working through professional organizations, charitable
groups, governmental agencies and special commissions, to issue mani-
festos stating the rights they believe children should have. Many, though
certainly not all, of the adherents of this point of view are in child welfare
and mental health fields. An example of the needs manifesto approach
is the declaration urged for adoption in 1969 by the Joint Commission
on the Mental Health of Children. 8  Among the prerogatives listed
were the right to be wanted, to live in a healthy environment, to have
basic needs satisfied, to receive continuous loving care, and to obtain
remedial treatment when needed.
The word "rights" as used in these manifestos does not necessarily
mean legal rights.79  The "rights" called for in manifestos would proba-
bly correspond more closely to what the law considers the "special needs
76. For example, juveniles in criminal cases have been extended the constitutional
rights to proof beyond a reasonable doubt before a finding of guilt. In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358 (1970). Similarly, it has been held that pretrial detention of juveniles with-
out probable cause violates the fourth amendment. Moss v. Weaver, 525 F.2d 1258
(1976).
It is of interest to note that six years after Gault was decided, Larry Schultz, di-
rector of the Juvenile Justice Standards Project of the A.B.A. and the Institute of Judicial
Administration, commented: "It has proved difficult enough just to secure the rights
given on paper by Gault." Schultz, Waifs of the Court-The Problems of Problem
Children, NATION, Oct. 29, 1973, at 426, 427.
77. This apt term is borrowed from Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43 Hv.
EDUC. REv. 487, 496 (1973).
78. See CRISIS IN CHILD MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 5, at 3.
79. This is one reason why lawyers and mental health personnel often fail in their
attempts to communicate with one another,
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and interest" of children. Courts have long taken the special needs and
interests of children into account in deciding what is in the best interests
of the child; some courts have even recognized them as legally enforcea-
ble rights."
The word "rights" used in this sense means that children should be
treated in accord with some concept of what is just. The rationale
relied upon to define these rights may be humanistic, religious, moral, or
philosophical beliefs, natural law, psycho-social needs, or even biologi-
cal fact. In the mental health field, children's rights are often given a
developmental justification-that is, children need these rights satisfied
in order to develop into physically and mentally healthy adults and to
realize their full potential as human beings."' Under this viewpoint, the
role of the state shifts from championing the child when his rights are
infringed upon or his welfare threatened to assuming a major obligation
for satisfying the child's basic needs.
The needs manifesto advocates are definitely child-oriented. In a
conflict between a child's needs and the requirements or legal rights of
an adult, their bias favors the child. Although they are often very
paternalistic, they are seriously concerned with the quality of life for all
children in America, not just those abused by their parents or in conflict
with society's institutions. These exponents of children's rights pre-
scribe a catalogue of the needs of children which must be met to ensure
the development of children into productive citizens. Theirs is a posi-
tive approach to child rearing as contrasted with present neglect-abuse
statutes, which are negative prescriptions.
It is apparent that adherents of the manifesto approach believe that
society is responsible for meeting the needs of its children. What is less
apparent, however, is that there are two very different levels of needs
involved. One layer is fairly tangible and is related to the child's
physical well-being. The other relates to the child's emotional well-
being and consists of intangibles.
80. An example of a "special need" that has been recognized by the courts is edu-
cation. A recent New Hampshire case states that a child's interests in elementary school
education are not coterminous with those of his parents. The child therefore has a right
to receive a proper education even though parents' religious beliefs prohibit viewing
audio-visual materials and listening to secular music. Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395
(D.N.H. 1974).
While most attempts to establish an absolute right to education have failed, the
Illinois Constitution gives all persons the right to be "educated to the limits of their ca-
pacities." ILL. CONST. art. 10, § 1.
81. For example, according to Marker and Friedman, "The rights of children
which are basic to human development include but are not limited to the right to be
raised in a supportive and nurturing environment; the right to adequate medical care;
Physical Needs
The needs manifesto advocates believe that society should meet the
requirements of all children for adequate food, clothing, housing, medi-
cal care, and education .8  Basically, they call for a social welfare
revolution, a political commitment on the part of the nation to children.
America has never before, in anything other than rhetoric, made such a
pledge to all of its children. Present social welfare policies are intended
to assist special children such as urban dwellers, the poor, minorities and
the mentally retarded.
Existing programs that benefit some children include survivors
insurance,"' Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 4 school lunch
programs,8 5 day care centers," low income housing, 7 and food
stamps.88 Many other controversial ideas have been discussed and re-
jected, such as a negative income tax, a guaranteed annual income, and
nationwide medical insurance.8 9
the right to an appropriate education; the right to protection from severe physical and
psychological abuse and neglect; and the right to have their own best interest adequately
represented in making of decisions which affect their lives." Marker & Friedman, Re-
thinking Children's Rights, CHILDREN TODAY, Nov. 1973, at 8.
82. For example, the twenty-five forum recommendations of the 1970 White
House Conference on Children called for such things as comprehensive, family-oriented
child health services, day care and early childhood education, a guaranteed basic family
income, a federally financed national child health care program, establishment of a child
advocacy agency, reform of the juvenile justice system, and the provision of health and
safety education. WHITE HousE CONFERENCE ON CHILDREN, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
423-42 (1970). See also Close, Selecting Priorities at the White House Conference on
Children, CHILDREN, Mar.-Apr. 1971, at 44, 47; Epstein, Priorities for Change: Some
Preliminary Proposals from the White House Conference on Children, CHILDREN, Jan.-
Feb. 1971, at 2, 7; Zigler, A National Priority: Raising the Quality of Children's Lives,
CHILDREN, Sept.-Oct. 1970 at 166, 170.
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (1970 &Supp. V, 1975).
84. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-10 (1970 & Supp. V, 1975).
85. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1751-68 (1970 & Supp. V, 1975).
86. See 42U.S.C. §§ 2931-33 (Supp. V, 1975).
87. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-40 (1970 & Supp. V. 1975). The act provides housing
for large families and low income families.
88. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-26 (1970 & Supp. V, 1975).
89. See, e.g., Briar, Why Children's Allowances? SOCIAL WORK, Jan. 1969, at 5;
Garfinkel, Negative Income Tax and Children's Allowance Programs: A Comparison,
SOCIAL WORK, Oct. 1968, at 33; Glasser, The Approaching Struggle to Provide Adequate
Health Care for All Americans, SOCIAL WORK, Oct. 1970, at 5; Harris, Selecting a
System of Income Maintenance for the Nation, SOCIAL WoK, Oct. 1969, at 5; Katz,
Four Income Maintenance Experiments, SOCIAL WORK, Mar. 1973, at 4; Levenstein, Day
Care: Gold Coin or Brass Check? SOCIAL WORK, Sept. 1972, at 35; Ozawa, Family
Allowances for the United States: An Analysis and a Proposal, SOCIAL WoRK, Oct. 1971,
at 72; Ozawa, Children's Right to Social Security, 53 CHILD WELFARE 619 (1974);
Shlakman, Book Review, SOCIAL WORK, Jan. 1969, at 126.
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Many people would disagree with the notion that the government
has the responsibility of providing for the well-being of its citizens. For
them, the proper role of government is to refrain from interfering with
an individual's pursuit of his own welfare. Others see governmental
involvement in children's welfare as a vehicle for the extension of
governmental control into the private lives of its citizens, particularly the
poor.90 Arguments over social welfare programs aside, the point is that
given a commitment by the nation to all children, it is theoretically
possible to meet all of their physical needs. The nation's priorities
would have to change; there would be many problems; the costs would
be staggering. But it could be done!
Some may see these children's advocates as idealists, but one can
hardly argue with their vision of a better life for the nation's children.
They may have to be content with a piecemeal revolution, but they
remain strong champions of the physical welfare of children, reminding
us of the inadequate health care, starvation, and poor housing that are
the fate of a substantial number of America's children.
Psychological Needs
The problems surrounding the tangible physical needs of children
are complex and controversial enough, but what of the difficulties
surrounding the emotional needs noted in these manifestos? How can
society guarantee a child the right to be wanted; to have continuous,
loving care; to grow up in a world without war; or to develop his full
potential?91
Intangible rights of this type are enthusiastically supported by
delegates to the United Nations and by White House conferees on the
welfare of the child. 2 Everyone endorses them; no one opposes them.
But are they anything more than rhetoric? Espousal of these rights
expresses a vision of a social utopia, the best possible world for children.
And, of course, improving the quality of life for children would improve
their parents' lives as well.
It is possible to conceive of concrete actions, all highly controver-
sial, that could be taken to insure fulfillment of some of these intangi-
bles. To improve a child's chances of being wanted, for example, one
might propose a compulsory universal sex education program in the
90. See Gould, Children's Rights: More Liberal Games, 2 SOCIAL POLICY, July-
Aug. 1971, at 50, 52.
91. See Konopka, supra note 3.
92. See notes 5 & 82 supra.
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schools, free contraceptives, free abortions, and a program of alternative
living arrangements for children who happen to be born to parents who
do not want them or cannot care for them. One can imagine the furor
such a policy would arouse. The values of many adults would conflict
sharply with the needs of children. Considering how difficult it is for
America to satisfy, even in a small way, the physical needs of children,
expecting the country to meet the emotional needs of children appears to
many to be pure fantasy.
However, one of the advantages of including psychological wants
among the "rights" in needs manifestos is the educational value of
presenting them for public debate. Discussion helps to sensitize people
to the psychological needs of children in situations such as custody
disputes."' While the law tends to stress the importance of the biologi-
cal parent, those who argue on behalf of children's emotional require-
ments would emphasize the psychological parent.94 A person who has
been the substitute parent for a young child over a period of time is
likely to have assumed emotional significance to the child. The child's
continued relationship with this psychological parent may be more
essential to the child's psychological well-being than would being reunit-
ed with a biological parent.95
Another important factor to consider in cases where a child is
separated from his natural parents is the child's ability to conceptualize
time.'" The younger the child, the shorter the period of separation he
can endure without suffering damaging psychological consequences.
This has serious implications for a court trying to plan a stable living
arrangement in a child's best interests. For a very young child, even
two months may be too long to be kept waiting in limbo.9 7 Courts are
not usually known for reaching speedy decisions, and it is well for them
to realize that their deliberateness itself may be antithetical to the child's
best interests. 98
The needs manifesto advocates see the child as a member of the
human race, although in a special class of membership because of the
child's vulnerability and dependency. They may tend to idealize chil-
93. See Note, A Child's Due Process Right to Counsel in Divorce Custody Pro-
ceedings, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 917, 918-19, 942 (1976).
94. See I. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHLD 17-21 (1973).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 40-49.
97. Id. at 41.
98. Id. at 42-45.
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dren and childhood, but they believe that children have a right to have
their physical and emotional needs met by caring adults. They seek to
create a healthy environment for every child in America.
Children's Liberation
In the last two decades there has been an upsurge in successful
movements for the civil rights of various groups. There are those who
believe that the last and greatest frontier of the rights movement is the
liberation of children. These children's advocates are not a large,
organized group,99 but they do have their vocal spokesmen. Two of the
more articulate proponents of children's liberation are educator John
Holt and California psychologist Richard Farson, both of whom have
written books on children's rights. °0
Holt proposes that the rights, privileges, duties and responsibilities
of adult citizens be made available to any young person, of whatever
age, who wants to make use of them.'"' The child should be able to
pick and choose which rights and duties he wants to assume. 1 2  Among
the rights Holt proposes children receive are the rights to vote; to work
for money; to have privacy; to manage one's own education; to receive
equal treatment at the hands of the law; to be legally responsible for
one's life and acts; to travel and live away from home; and to achieve
financial independence and responsibility-that is, to own, buy and sell
property, to borrow money, to establish credit, and to sign conracts. 1:
In general, Holt believes that a child should have the right to do what
any adult may legally do.'
Farson also argues for the adoption of a single standard of morality
and behavior for children and adults. According to his view, children
99. "On the rise across the U.S. is a 'children's liberation' movement .... At
least four national organizations of attorneys and countless public-welfare groups have
joined the fray in behalf of [children] ....
"Mostly, however, the new campaign is being waged through legal channels with
help from professional activists, liberal parents and other interested adults." U.S. NEws
& WORLD REP., Aug. 5, 1974, at 42. In Farson's view, however, "there is no big concern
for children's rights. There is a generalized concern to protect children, but not to pro-
tect children's rights. . . .Children's liberation is not now a children's effort. It is lar-
gely an effort by adults to raise the consciousness of the children." FORBES, Jan. 15,
1974, at 34.
100. See J. HOLT, ESCAPE FROM CHILDHOOD (1974) [hereinafter cited as HOLT];
R. FARSON, BIRTHRIGHTS (1974) [hereinafter cited as FARSON].
101. See HOLT, supra note 100, at 18.
102. Id. at 19.
103. Id. at 18-19.
104. Id. at 19.
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should be allowed to engage in any act acceptable for adults and should
need no special approval to do things for which permission is automati-
cally granted to adults. 10 5 Farson believes that what is best for the child
should be decided by the child himself, not by his parents or some other
concerned adult. As he puts it, "The issue of self-determination is at
the heart of children's liberation. It is . . .a definition of the entire
concept."'10 6 His list of rights for children is much the same as that
submitted by Holt, but he adds a general right to information (not
limited to what adults want children to know, but free access to whatev-
er information children want); 1 7 and a right to responsive design of the
environment (for example, space to play and ride bicycles safely without
being endangered by cars).'0 " Farson also discusses the right to be free
from physical punishment0 9 and the right to sexual freedom. 1 0
Both Holt and Farson are calling for full citizenship for all chil-
dren. As full citizens, children would possess whatever legal rights
adults have. The basis for granting these rights to children, according
to Farson, is a commitment to freedom, because expanding freedom as a
way of life is worthwhile in itself."'
Many critics label the idea of children's liberation as nonsense.
Objections abound: children are not responsible; children are selfish;
children would want to do things that were bad for them; parents would
lose all control over their children. 1 2  Yet, children's liberation is not
the ridiculous concept that it might at first appear to be. It is based
upon valid rationales. To understand the concept, one must compre-
hend the thinking and assumptions that lie behind the child libera-
tionist's viewpoint.
Liberation advocates do not favor intervention for the child's wel-
fare. They are committed to the long-term goal of working to secure
for children full citizenship and protection of their rights. They take
105. See FARsON, supra note 100, at 27.
106. Id.
107. FARSON, supra note 100, at 83-95.
108. Id. at 63-82.
109. Id. at 113-28.
110. Id. at 129-53. See also HOLT, supra note 100, at 270-76.
111. See FARsoN, supra note 100, at 31.
112. For example, Professor Frank Sanders of Harvard Law School has been quoted
as saying, "We are coming closer to interfering in the traditional functioning family....
My own feeling is that the general movement toward giving children greater rights
makes sense, but it raises questions about the unity of the family and the ability of the
courts to intrude into families in making various decisions." Boston Globe, Nov. 9,
1976, at 21, col. 1. Sanders was referring to recent court decisions extending children's
rights, but his reservations about intrusions into the family are relevant here.
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the position that the interests of a group can be safeguarded only if it
has recognized rights that are scrupulously enforced.
In Farson's opinion, the doctrine of parens patriae, under which
the state intervenes as a loving parent in the best interest of the child, is
actually harmful to the child. He says, "In dealing with children's
rights what is good for the child is, to some extent, beside the point.
Focusing on the welfare of the child rather than on his full rights to
citizenship leads us to create all kinds of protective legislation and
privileges which in the long run actually militate against the child.
Whenever we deny people their civil rights in an effort to 'protect' them,
we usually wind up having made their plight even worse." '113 Farson
cites as an example the juvenile justice system.114 "The system is not
more benign [than the adult system] it is more unfair, more cruel, more
arbitrary, and more repressive."' 15 Children will not be safe, Farson
contends, until they are valued for themselves, not just as potential
adults.
To achieve this goal, Farson argues that children must become a
political force-that is, they must have the right to vote. Children are
no one's constituency,116 and as a consequence politicians pay little
attention to what children want or need. Farson sees the task facing
liberationists as that of working with children to help them secure the
right to vote.117  One can be a social welfare advocate and still be
paternalistic, but it is impossible to advocate children's liberation and be
SO.
The ideas of children voting shocks many people. After all, it is
assumed that children are immature, incompetent and unable to make
informed and intelligent decisions. But Farson urges that in a free and
democratic society, there is no valid basis for excluding children from
the decisionmaking process." 8  We have given up property, literacy,
knowledge, race, sex and wealth as acceptable reasons for depriving
adults of the right to vote. Competence is not the issue for adults-we
do not bar alcoholics or mentally ill adults from voting-and there is no
reason why it should be so for children." 9 The ability to make in-
113. FARSON, supra note 100, at 196-97.
114. Id. at 191-212. Farson notes that it was the abuses of the paternalistic juve-
nile court system with its lax procedural rules that the Supreme Court criticized in Gault.
Id. at 191.
115. Id.
116. See FARSON, supra note 100, at 177.
117. Id. at 175-90. See also HOLT, supra note 100, at 155-71.
118. See FARSON, supra note 100, at 178.
119. Id. at 182.
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formed and intelligent decisions is a sound argument for denying chil-
dren the vote only if that standard is applied Vo all citizens. 120  It is
doubtful that children would vote any more recklessly, irresponsibly, or
selfishly than many adults have demonstrated they are capable of doing.
As for children voting for their own best interests, that is precisely the
reason for giving them the vote.
It should be clear at this point that liberation advocates have a very
different working hypothesis about children and the nature of child-
hood. They believe that many of our notions about children and
childhood are myths. Holt deals extensively with the subject of the
competence of children121 and the concept of childhood as a modem
day invention.' 22 He does not see children as innocent, helpless and
dependent to the extent that most people see them. If children do act
this way, it is because our expectations of children lead us to treat them
in ways that make our expectations come true. It is difficult to say how
much of the behavior we consider to be the essential nature of children
is really caused by the ways in which children are reared. Not all
children, for example, are irresponsible, nor are all children of a specific
age equally irresponsible. As applied to children, responsibility is
usually defined by adults as a child doing what an adult tells him to do
without complaining or evading. Rarely is it defined as a child's ability
to follow through on some goal which the child has set for himself.
Instead of assuming that all children are incompetent, children's libera-
tion would reverse this presumption-children would be presumed com-
petent until particular evidence proved otherwise. 123
It might be helpful to an understanding of children's liberation to
deal specifically with some of the objections raised to it. Consider, for
example, the contention that children's liberation would destroy parental
authority and control over children. Most critics operate from a con-
cept of authority that involves strictness, punishment, and use of force to
induce fear in children. Holt, Farson, and many mental health profes-
sionals operate under a different perception of relationships between
children and adults, based on love, trust, and mutual respect. Libera-
tion advocates generally have an unstinting belief in the goodness of
man, including children. They theorize that relationships between
adults and children will work out for the best when both groups are on
an equal footing of power. In their view, the rights of one group will
120. Id. at 184.
121. See HOLT, supra note 100, at 87-101.
122. Id. at 23-44.
123. See Foster & Freed, supra note 1, at 371.
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operate as a check and balance on the freedom of the other, and vice
versa.
Another criticism of children's liberation is that it advocates per-
missiveness-a child would be allowed to do whatever he wanted to do.
Many people think in terms of children's rights versus adult rights.
Thus, either adults have dominant rights, or children have complete
license. Neither Holt nor Farson favor permissiveness. They are both
realistic in viewing the natural limitations that will operate on the rights
of children. It is unlikely that five year olds are going to troop en masse
to the polls on election day. Not all children would want to work, and
in any case it would be unrealistic to expect the labor market to absorb
them all when it cannot even employ all of the adults who want to work.
Also, children have few employable skills. But, in the view of libera-
tionists, a child who wants to work should not be deprived of the right to
do so simply because he is a child.
Nor are liberation advocates pushing any particular form of behav-
ior for children. In regard to his proposal for sexual freedom, for
example, Farson says his position "does not mean the advocacy of any
particular form of sexuality for adults and children. 124 It does advocate
the freedom for children to conduct their own sexual lives with no more
restrictions than adults.' 125
But, critics would ask, don't children need more restrictions than
adults? This question takes us back full circle to our concepts of
children. How each of us answers that question is determined by how
we see children. No adult can see children as they truly are. The
experts on children are children themselves. The essence of children's
liberation is that adults should not decide what is best for children, but
that children have the right to participate in decisionmaking if their
interests are concerned.
Granting children the right of self-determination does not mean
that they can be irresponsible. Indeed, Foster and Freed point out,
"[T]he more self-determination and responsibility accorded to minors,
the greater the accountability.' 26 These two lawyers propose a bill of
rights for children based on the principle that children are people. The
rights they suggest include the rights to be educated; to be regarded as a
person; to be heard and listened to; and to be free of legal disabilities or
124. FARSON, supra note 100, at 152.
125. Id. at 153.
126. Foster & Freed, supra note 1, at 344.
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incapacities except where they are necessary and protective of the actual
best interests of the child.
127
A social worker also presented in an article a catalog of basic
human rights which she believes must be accepted as applying to young
people as well as to adults. Among them she lists the rights of the
individual to speak his own thoughts, consistent with the rights of
others; to develop abilities to their full potential; to air grievances and to
seek redress; to make mistakes without unreasonable punishment; and
to experiment in various aspects of life as long as others are not
harmed. 12
8
These views can be reduced to a few basics. Children are people
and have a right to be regarded as human beings rather than being
treated as things. "[Children] are entitled to assert individual interests
in their own right, to have a fair consideration given to their claims, and
to have their best interests judged in terms of pragmatic conse-
quences."' 29
Children's liberation would require a cultural revolution. For it to
become a reality, many of our cherished values, beliefs, and attitudes
would have to change. Ideas about childhood, family life, authority,
discipline, the role of parents, freedom, and the basic nature of mankind
and children would have to be reevaluated. There is no doubt that
many aspects of society would be altered under children's liberation.
Children's liberationists are concerned with a mixture of both legal
rights and human needs. Most rights are interrelated and few can stand
alone. An older child would be unable to live apart from his family, for
example, unless he was financially able to support himself. He would
have to be allowed to work and earn money, to keep what he earns and
to manage his own affairs. However, unless the child is free from the
threat of physical punishment, all other rights are mockeries. Children
cannot be free in a society where "might makes right."
According to child liberation advocates, children do not comprise a
special group that needs protection. Instead, they need consistently en-
forced legal rights equal to those of adults. They need freedom,
democracy, and full citizenship.
Con'dusion
The children's rights movement includes at least four distinct view-
127. Id. at 347.
128. See Konopka, supra note 3.
129. Foster & Freed, supra note 1, at 346.
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points. One group argues for protective legislation to guard children's
welfare; a second faction urges that selected legal rights, such as the
right to procedural due process, be extended to children; a third school
issues needs manifestos proclaiming the physical and psychological
needs of children that the state is obligated to satisfy; the fourth group
proposes liberation for children, according them all of the legal rights
and duties that are now the special preserve of adults. All share a
common interest in the well-being of children. As a movement, they
challenge the conscience of society to reevaluate its attitudes toward and
treatment of children.
There are those who criticize the legitimacy of singling out children
for liberation when so many adults are still deprived of their rights and
fail to have their needs met. What is the logic, these critics demand, of
reaching out to children while ignoring the plight of many adults in our
society? In a broader context, the children's liberation movement is
only the latest in a series of rights movements for oppressed groups. In
a society where the integrity of each individual is respected, rights are
not an issue. That they are an issue in America is indicative of the
difference in the value this society places on certain individuals.
While America claims to be a child-oriented society, it does not, in
fact, value children very highly. Each year, more than one million
American children are victims of physical abuse or neglect. 3 ' At the
very least, two thousand children die each year as a consequence of mal-
treatment.'31 These figures do not include the thousands of children who
die each year from accidents, many of them caused by environmental
hazards to children, such as cars, which are tolerated for the conve-
nience of adults. We have allowed our environment to become increas-
ingly dangerous to the health and safety of our children.
Violence toward children, both direct and indirect, is an accepted
part of childrearing in America, not by just a few "bad" parents who
abuse their children but by otherwise "good" parents, schools, 13 2 juve-
nile facilities, and children's institutions. Coercion and cruelty have
never made for good parenting, good teaching, good child care, or for
that matter, good children. If we are to begin somewhere, let it be with
130. The figures were released by HEW in November 1975 and reported by the
American Orthopsychiatric Association in 1976. American Orthopsychiatric Ass'n
Newsletter, Summer 1976, at 8.
131. Id.
132. Farson reports that 62% of the American people and about 70% of teachers
favor corporal punishment in the schools. Farson, Next-Children's Lib?, FORBES, Jan.
15, 1974, at 34.
ensuring children freedom from physical punishment and abuse at the
hands of adults and social institutions.
This term the Supreme Court heard argument on its first corporal
punishment case involving the use of spanking in schools.' 3 The case
involved parents in Dade County, Florida, who alleged that their chil-
dren were paddled so severely at school that several required hospital
treatment. 3 4 In earlier decisions, lower courts in Texas"3 5 and North
Carolina"' approved of spanking. The issue before the Supreme
Court, however, was not whether schools have the authority to spank,
but rather what constitutes excessive punishment. What is needed from
the Court is not a guideline for spanking, but an end to abuse of
children in schools.
The children's rights movement, if we listen to its message, is a call
for a reconsideration of our society's attitudes toward people. In 1938,
Grace Abbott, former head of the Children's Bureau, said, "The
progress of a state may be measured by the extent to which it safeguards
the rights of its children.' 13 7
By that standard, how would we evaluate America?
133. See Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 425 U.S. 990
(1976).
134. See id. at 911.
135. See Ware v. Estes, 328 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 458
F.2d 1360 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972).
136. See Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C.), aff'd, 423 U.S. 907 (1975).
137. 1 G. ABBott, Preface to THE CHILD AND THE STATE at vii (1938).
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